Then, and even now, that fact would add “proof” to the trail of what his enemies identified in Estenoz since 1912: that he promoted an uprising against the Republic and the Cuban nation.Ī fragment of Estenoz’s alleged letter reads: occupation of Cuba) placed the matter in the hands of two of the leading protagonists involved in the conflict. Consul in Santiago de Cuba, enthusiast of the U.S. Secretary of State (through Holaday, U.S. The double component of it being “signed” by Estenoz, and of it being addressed to Philander Knox, U.S. The letter acquired relevance in recent years, since Rafael Fermoselle and Rolando Rodríguez cited it from their copy in the National Archives in the United States. “From Estenoz to Knox, through the consul in Santiago de Cuba,” June 15, 1912.
In addition, I draw attention to a document from Estenoz’s papers, undiscussed until this moment, which I suggest should be considered Estenoz’s “political testament” as part of the need to establish new recollection politics regarding the IPC.Įstenoz’s alleged letter The supposed letter from Estenoz (original fragment). My finding is that primary sources from 1912, hitherto under-explored, show consensus in considering that letter as forged. In no case has any information been provided, as far as I know, that contradicts the veracity of that letter. In this regard, a letter, supposedly signed by Evaristo Estenoz, one of the leaders of the IPC, dated June 15, 1912-12 days before his assassination, in conditions of great isolation and persecution-has served as proof of such intention.
Currently, it is a central topic in Cuban historiography, which has produced very heated debates.Ī part of the studies on the uprising have been loyal to the thesis with which the protest was judged at the time: they accuse the IPC of having made strategic errors, not having established alliances with other popular sectors, concentrating exclusively on the abolition of the MA, and miscalculating the national political playing field at the time it launched its armed protest, so that the reaction to it, on the part of white, mixed-race, and Black sectors, would have compromised the space of the anti-racist struggle in the future.įor that reason, interpretations of the protest have concluded that the uprising would have provoked a “fratricidal war,” an “error” on the part of the IPC which threatened “national unity,” and which opened the door to U.S. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the IPC uprising is a historiographical case that has been discussed extensively, especially in the last decade, in the context of the rise of anti-racist debate and activism on the island.
Two years later, its armed protest against the MA was drowned in blood in what has been the largest massacre inflicted by the Cuban State since its founding as a Republic in 1902, with estimates of between 500 and 5,000 dead, or more.Īccording to the most accessible interpretation of the MA, the Black and mixed-race electorate, between 30% and 43% of the total, could vote for the IPC, thus depriving the liberal and conservative parties of these voters and of the consumer networks established with this sector. The MA was resisted by the sector that created in 1908 the Independent Colored Grouping-christened in 1910 as the Independent Party of Color (IPC)-because in fact, despite being an interracial party, it was prohibited from intervening in national politics. In exchange, the Enmienda Morúa, or Morúa Amendment (MA) allowed political alliances, as long as they represented multiple class and racial interests. In 1910, the Cuban Congress passed an Amendment to the Electoral Law, presented by Liberal Party Senator Martin Morúa Delgado, which prohibited the existence of racially-determined political parties.
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